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Political Dynamics of Foreign-Invested Development 
Projects in Decentralized Indonesia:  
The Case of Coal Railway Projects in Kalimantan
Morishita Akiko*
Resource-rich Indonesia has been promoting massive infrastructure development 
projects involving billions of dollars in the aftermath of the Seoharto era.  One area 
of intense focus is in Kalimantan which required infrastructure development for 
extractive industries, particularly coal.  Since the early 2000s, the central and local 
governments as well as foreign companies have been interested in embarking on 
the first-ever railway construction projects for transportation of coal in Kalimantan. 
However, the projects have experienced several setbacks including changes to its 
original plans and delays to approvals.  This paper explores the reasons why the 
local development projects could not progress smoothly from a political viewpoint. 
It argues that Indonesia’s democratization and decentralization have brought about 
unremitting struggles over power and resources among local political elites.  Some-
times national politicians and even foreign investors are embroiled in the struggles 
of the local leaders when venturing into such development projects.  The coal rail-
way projects in Kalimantan highlight how local government leaders deal with the 
central government and foreign investors in their attempt to secure their position 
politically and financially in the venture, which would give them an edge over their 
rivals.  This paper reveals the strategy of local power players who project them-
selves as defenders of local communities and the environment although a gap exists 
between their rhetorics and the realities on the ground in Kalimantan.
Keywords: Indonesian local politics, foreign investment for railway construction, 
coal transportation, Barito region, Kalimantan
I Introduction
Indonesian government leaders, both at the national and local levels, have promoted 
infrastructure development for extractive industries, particularly coal, at a time when 
global demand for it is rising.  Local politicians in natural resource-rich regions are 
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embarking on development projects at a rapid pace, using their influence as leverage to 
broker deals with foreign investors.  The first-ever railway construction projects for coal 
transportation has been in the pipeline in Kalimantan since the early 2000s when feasibil-
ity studies were undertaken.  However, several of the projects have experienced changes 
and delays.  As a result, the construction of the railway tracks has yet to begin as of early 
2016 and this paper explores the reasons why the multibillion-dollar development proj-
ects could not progress smoothly from a political viewpoint.
During the New Order period (1967–98), Indonesia was highly centralized and local 
authorities only acted as agents of the central government.  Consequently, studies on 
international business-government relations focused on interactions between foreign 
firms and the central government (Khong 1980; 1986).  In today’s decentralized Indone-
sia, however, provincial and district governments have extensive regulatory authority 
over local matters and hold the authorization rights for enterprises in their provinces and 
districts.1)  District governments have the authority to issue a variety of business permits 
and licenses—such as a mining services business license (izin usaha jasa pertambangan, 
IUJP), a building permit (izin mendirikan bangunan, IMB), and an environmental permit 
(izin lingkungan)—within their own districts, while provincial governments have the 
authority to issue permits and licenses for business operations extending beyond a single 
district within a province.2)
Given that both the central and local governments participate in the processes of 
foreign investment projects, investors now “need to play a different game to get access 
to local resources, which becomes more complicated” (Priyambudi and Erb 2009, 15). 
Investors have responded to various demands from local governments, ranging from 
corporate social responsibility programs for local communities to bribery of officials, in 
order to develop a harmonious relationship with local stakeholders (Indra and Emil 2009). 
Some foreign companies, especially in the mining sector, also face protests and conflicts 
with local communities and NGO groups over land and environmental issues (Gedicks 
2001; Indra and Emil 2009; JATAM 2010).
In addition to direct demands from and confrontations with local stakeholders, this 
paper demonstrates why foreign and multinational corporations—not to speak of the 
1) According to Decentralization Law No. 22/1999, obligatory sectors for the local government include 
health, education, public works, environment, communication, transport, agriculture, industry and 
trade, capital investment, land, cooperatives, manpower, and infrastructure services.  Provincial 
governments are required to coordinate local governments and perform functions that affect more 
than one local government (World Bank 2008, 113).
2) IUJP, IMB, and environmental permits are under the purview of Regulation of the Minister of 
Energy and Mineral Resources No. 28/2009; Government Regulation No. 32/2010; and Government 
Regulation No. 27/2012 respectively.
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central government and Jakarta-based big companies—need to be aware of a different 
layer of political dynamics, specifically local politics, including intra-provincial power 
struggles as well as inter-provincial relations when venturing into local development 
projects.
In Indonesian political studies, many scholars have examined local politics since 
democratization and decentralization brought about unremitting struggles over power 
and resources among local political elites (Aspinall and Fealy 2003; Schulte Nordholt and 
van Klinken 2007; Erb and Priyambudi 2009; Hadiz 2010; Choi 2011).  Some have also 
explored central and local government relations with a focus on the formation of new 
provinces (Okamoto 2007; Kimura 2012) and the privatization of state-owned enterprises 
(Wahyu 2005; 2006).  The relationships between local governments and global players, 
however, have not been discussed thoroughly enough despite the fact that direct encoun-
ter between them occurs particularly at foreign investment project sites.
Thus, this paper gives a clear picture of the local-global relations in decentralized 
Indonesia, specifically a tripartite relationship of local governments, foreign companies, 
and the central government through the case study of coal railway projects in Kalimantan. 
It shows how local government leaders deal with the central government and foreign 
investors in their attempt to secure their position and financial assistance in the project 
venture, which would give them an edge in local power struggles.  To put it another way, 
even a big foreign firm with immense financial clout and support from the central govern-
ment can face difficulty in securing investment deals if its proposed project potentially 
undermines the power base of local political leaders.
This paper also illustrates how local power players secure their position in a project 
venture by manipulating the sentiments of local communities and environmental issues. 
Since the democratization and decentralization of Indonesia, local power players have 
more often than not exploited social and cultural issues for political purposes, particularly 
in direct elections for the positions of local government heads (Erb and Priyambudi 2009; 
Aspinall 2011).  One of the most widely used campaign strategies is to promote the 
resurgence of customary culture and traditional institutions (Davidson and Henley 2007). 
Even while in power, as this paper demonstrates, local government leaders project them-
selves as defenders of local communities and the environment so that they will be able 
to hold a leading position in their negotiations with foreign and national players.  This 
paper exposes a gap between this “defender of local communities and the environment” 
rhetoric and the reality on the ground when it comes to whether local power players 
really care for their region’s people and nature.
In what follows, this paper briefly describes the economic background of the devel-
opment of railway projects in Kalimantan.  It illustrates chronologically various efforts 
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by the central and local governments and foreign companies to construct a railway net-
work, and the arising conflicts of interests among them.  In conclusion, the paper sets 
the direction for future research by providing an insight into the dealings of local leaders 
in the railway construction projects and the impact of local political conditions on foreign 
investment projects in Kalimantan.
II Coal behind the Railway Network
Coal has played an important role in Indonesia’s economic development; the country has 
extensive deposits—possibly sufficient for another 100–150 years to come (Daulay et al. 
2007).  The production of coal has been increasing steadily, growing from 40.1 million 
tons in 1995 to 75.6 million tons in 2000 and 152.8 million tons in 2005.  In 2010, the total 
production of coal rose to 275.2 million tons.  The increase in coal production is due to 
rising demand, especially from Asian countries, such as China, Japan, Korea, and India 
(Indoanalisis 2012).
Today Indonesia is the largest coal exporter in the world, followed by Australia 
(Ewart and Vaughn 2009).  Kalimantan has the second-largest coal reserves in the coun-
try (see Map 1), after Sumatra.  Kalimantan is the biggest coal-producing region, having 
provided more than 93 percent of the country’s thermal coal production in 2011 (SALVA 
Report, 2012).  Kalimantan’s coal is high-grade, with high calorific value and a low ash 
and sulfur content, which makes it saleable on the export and domestic markets 
 (Harrington and Trivett 2012).  The spread of coal reserves is mainly in East, South, and 
Central Kalimantan, where 69 mines operated as of 2005; there was only 1 mine in West 
Kalimantan (Hanan 2006).
Provincial governments in Kalimantan recognized the necessity of building a railway 
network for more efficient transportation of coal from interior mining areas to ports of 
lading.  At present, inland coal transportation in Kalimantan is conducted by trucks and 
barges that convey coal to an offshore loading point or a coal terminal for transshipment. 
The capacities of the existing road and river transportation networks for coal are quite 
limited.  Yet, not a single rail line was constructed for coal transportation in Kalimantan, 
due to the high construction cost and weak institutional capacity to construct new railway 
lines—including the Railway Law (Law No. 13/1992), which only permitted the state-
owned railway company PT Kereta Api Indonesia (PT KAI) to construct railroads (Hanan 
2006).
In 2000 the Institute of Energy Economics Japan (IEEJ), a Japanese think tank, 
conducted a preliminary feasibility study on railway coal transportation in Kalimantan, 
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based on its view that newly developed mines would be located farther inland than exist-
ing mines and that the use of barges for coal transportation might be unsuitable.  Using 
a linear programming (LP) model, IEEJ determined the coal transportation route that 
could best maximize earnings of individual mines in Kalimantan as a whole.  It estimated 
the production and transportation costs incurred by new mines, based on survey results 
of the currently operating mines, and prepared three scenarios for coal transportation 
routes: the existing truck and barge system, a combination of the existing system plus 
railway, and a railway network system.  By running an LP model, IEEJ simulated the 
three scenarios and concluded that maximum earnings could be realized by using rail 
transportation to convey coal from mines rather than using existing road and river net-
works (IEEJ 2002).
A feasibility study for the provincial government of Central Kalimantan also stated 
that coal transportation by road was viable only for short distances and that rivers, like 
the Barito in the eastern part of the province, suffered from seasonal variations that made 
transportation during the dry season unreliable (Central Kalimantan Provincial Govern-
ment 2009).  Based on the recommendations of the feasibility studies that the railway 
network was a cost-effective, reliable all-season mode of transportation for coal resources, 
the central and provincial governments embarked on the Kalimantan railway network 
venture with foreign multinational companies.
Map 1 Coal Reserves in Indonesia (2011)
Source: Based on Kementerian Energi dan Sumber Daya Mineral (2012).
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III Development of Railway Projects in Kalimantan
Starting as a Big Regional Dream
The original concept of a vast railway network in Kalimantan began as part of a broader 
picture of regional economic cooperation and integration when a proposal for a trans-
Borneo railway network was discussed at a meeting of the Brunei Darussalam-Indonesia-
Malaysia-Philippines East ASEAN Growth Area (BIMP-EAGA) in 1997.  Under the 
BIMP-EAGA railway project, the plan was to build a rail link between Brunei, Sabah, 
Sarawak, and Kalimantan and to form part of the Pan-EAGA Multi-Capital Transportation 
Network approved by the subregional grouping in 2000 (Europa Publications 2003, 218). 
The network would be used mainly for goods trains, with the aim of stimulating regional 
economic growth.  Construction was to have begun in 2001, starting with a rail linking 
Sabah, Brunei, and Sarawak (Jakarta Post, April 21, 1999).
Historically, since the colonial days in Borneo, there have been railway tracks in 
Sabah and Brunei, covering only a small part of the northern area but not linked with each 
other.  Roads and rivers have been the main mode of transportation in Kalimantan, 
 Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei.  In Kalimantan, arterial roads connect a provincial capital 
to most district capitals and small towns within the province.  There are also inter-
provincial roads.  But some stretches of road have been severely damaged and even 
destroyed, especially on routes used daily by trucks carrying tons of timber, oil palm, 
coal, and other heavy loads (Tempo Interaktif, August 3, 2012).  River transportation is 
the main mode for people traveling between coastal towns and villages in the upstream 
interior areas.
At the international level, a cross-border road connects Pontianak, the provincial 
capital of West Kalimantan, to Kuching, the state capital of Sarawak.3)  Yet, there is no 
road network connecting other provincial capitals in Kalimantan to the state capitals of 
Sarawak and Sabah or Brunei’s capital, Bandar Seri Begawan.  Only small tracks and 
partly unpaved roads at the border areas are available for local people crossing the inter-
national border.  Marine and air transportation is also used for cross-border flows of 
people and goods between Kalimantan and Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei, but such modes 
are unsuitable for the daily mass transportation required to stimulate regional economic 
growth as envisaged by the BIMP-EAGA railway project.
In April 2000 a Sabah-based company, Keretapi Trans-Borneo Berhad (KTB), and 
the Kuala Lumpur-based Business Focus Sdn Bhd signed a memorandum of understand-
ing (MoU) in Kota Kinabalu to construct a 3,640 km trans-Borneo railway.  It would link 
3) It usually takes about 8 to 10 hours to drive from Pontianak to Kuching.
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all major towns in Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, and Kalimantan by the year 2010 (New Straits 
Times, April 18, 2000).  It was supposed to be financed by German investors; and in June 
2002 the German consulting firm, Project Development Management South East Asia, 
announced that it had allocated US$7 million for its feasibility study (Europa Publications 
2003, 218).  The project proposal was supported by the state government of Sabah, but 
neither the provincial governments of Kalimantan nor the state government of Sarawak 
were aware of it.
Despite the BIMP-EAGA’s big vision of regional integration, the proposed Borneo 
trans-regional railway project was abandoned.  The Sabah-based KTB apparently gave 
up the plan due to lack of funding.  The German companies, which were supposed to be 
the major players, also expressed some uncertainty over investing in such a project. 
According to Soenarno, then Indonesian minister of settlement and regional infrastruc-
ture, investors were concerned about a delay in the return on their investments since 
they were not sure whether the situation in Indonesia was conducive to investing (Tempo 
Interaktif, August 26, 2004).4)
Around the time that the BIMP-EAGA proposal was taking shape, Indonesia had 
also initiated its own plans for the construction of the first-ever railway system in Kali-
mantan as part of the trans-Borneo railway project.  In 2002, at least 10 Indonesian private 
companies proposed forming a consortium for this mega project.  Giving a push for the 
rapid progress of the railway infrastructure project, Minister of Settlement and Regional 
Infrastructure Soenarno granted provincial governors in Kalimantan permission to par-
ticipate in it (Indonesian Ministry of State Owned Enterprises 2002).  The four prov-
inces—East, South, Central, and West Kalimantan—individually showed an interest in 
the railway project and offered to facilitate its preliminary feasibility studies, conducted 
through cooperation among the relevant agencies of the central government and foreign 
experts (Wanly 2012).
In August 2004 the Indonesian government decided to look for other investors for 
railway construction in Kalimantan and began asking the World Bank and Asian Develop-
ment Bank to borrow capital.  After Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected to the 
presidency in October 2004, the inflow of FDI increased.  It grew from US$1.9 billion in 
2004 to US$8.3 billion in 2005, reaching US$13.3 billion in 2010 (ASEAN Secretariat 
4) Indonesia’s investment climate deteriorated after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98.  In 1997 the 
inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) was US$4.7 billion, but the following year Indonesia 
experienced a greater outflow than inflow, posting a negative of US$356 million.  The country kept 
registering a negative inflow of FDI from 1998 to 2001 and in 2003 (ASEAN Secretariat 2006, 13). 
Frequent labor disputes and rapid wage increases also caused the relocation of foreign firms to other 
Southeast Asian countries such as Vietnam (Thee 2006).
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2006, 13; 2012).  But for quite some time, the Indonesian government found it difficult 
to attract new investors for the railway project.  A local newspaper in South Kalimantan 
reported in 2006 that even the provincial head of the Department of Mining and Energy 
was unable to confirm when construction would begin since it depended on investors. 
The reporter remarked that the project appeared to be just a dream (Radar Banjarmasin, 
July 28, 2006).
Local Governments Stay on Track
While the central government made little progress on the railway project, the provincial 
government of Central Kalimantan worked steadily on its own railway plan.  Decentral-
ization enabled local governments to engage in railway construction and operations. 
Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 25/2000, linked to the Decentraliza-
tion Law (Law No. 22/1999), defined the division of authority of the central and local 
governments such that district and municipal governments were given the authority to 
plan and construct a railway network in a single district or city while provincial govern-
ments were allowed to plan and construct railway networks connecting districts and 
cities within a single province.5)
A new Railway Law (Law No. 23/2007) also outlined and defined the three permits 
required for railway infrastructure: a business license (izin usaha), a construction permit, 
(izin pembangunan), and an operations permit (izin operasi).  The central government 
has the authority to issue business licenses, while provincial governments have the 
authority to issue construction and operations permits for railway networks connecting 
districts and cities within a single province with approval from the central government. 
The district governments can also issue construction and operations permits with the 
recommendation of the provincial government and approval of the central government.6)
In line with those laws and regulations, Agustin Teras Narang,7) then governor of 
Central Kalimantan, signed an MoU with the Japanese company Itochu Corporation in 
5) The Government Regulation also defined the authority of provincial governments in 20 sectors, 
including agriculture, marine, mining and energy, forestry and plantation, and transportation.
6) See Chapter 5 of Law No. 23/2007.
7) Agustin Teras Narang was born to a local Dayak family in 1955.  Dayak is a loose generic term for 
the indigenous communities of Kalimantan.  The Narang family is one of the influential families 
among local Dayaks, especially in the central part of Central Kalimantan.  Narang’s grandfather was 
a traditional customary leader and also a Christian church leader in the Kapuas region (interview 
with a local Dayak historian, April 2005).  His father was a local businessman, and his elder brother 
is a local politician who is now the provincial chairman of the Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDI-P).  Agustin Teras Narang himself was a lawyer and served as a parliament member 
of PDI-P before being elected as governor.  He won the elections for governor of Central  Kalimantan 
in 2005 and in 2010.
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2007.8)  The MoU was for a feasibility study for the construction of a 300 km railway run-
ning north to south within the Barito region in the eastern part of Central Kalimantan, 
and the estimated cost of the project was US$1 billion.  Hatta Rajasa, then Indonesian 
coordinating minister for the economy, attended the MoU signing ceremony.  Itochu had 
coal-mining concessions in Central Kalimantan and intended to build the railway in the 
region (Kompas, April 16, 2007).
Giving a background of the coal railway project in the Barito region, the provincial 
government stated the following:
Central Kalimantan is a major source of high-grade coal that is in demand nationally and inter-
nationally.  The provincial government has already issued permits for the extraction of coal in large 
areas of the Barito River valley and actual extraction is now starting.  However, there are significant 
constraints to the transportation of coal to the seaports on the Kalimantan coast caused by distance, 
remoteness of the area, and the lack of reliable transportation.  Transportation by road is only 
feasible for comparatively short distances, and the Barito River suffers from seasonal variation, 
which makes transportation during the dry season unreliable except in the lower reaches of the 
river. (Central Kalimantan Provincial Government 2009, ii)
Fifteen big companies have conducted coal-mining operations, covering a 527,444 ha 
concession area in Central Kalimantan.  Among them, seven have concessions in the Barito 
region, including the Itochu subsidiary PT Marunda Graha Mineral; the military-related 
PT Asmin Koalindo Tuhup; and PT Maruwai Coal, a subsidiary of the Australia-United 
Kingdom affiliated PT BHP Billiton Indonesia.  Another 17 small and medium-sized coal 
companies also have concessions in the region but were not active as of 2009 (ibid., 9).
Under the planned Central Kalimantan railway network, the following five routes 
were chosen:
a. Route 1: 360 km railway running north-south from the interior district of Murung 
Raya in the upper Barito to a port in the coastal district of Kapuas in the south-
eastern part of the province (see Route 1 in Map 2);
b. Route 2: 195 km railway running north-south from the interior district of  Lamandau 
to a port in the coastal district of West Kotawaringin in the western part of the 
province (see Route 2 in Map 2);
c. Route 3: 466 km railway running east-west in the mid-west part of the province, 
connecting Murung Raya District to a port in the southwestern district of Seruyan 
(see Route 3 in Map 2);
8) A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) is generally a statement of intent and does not imply any 
legally binding obligation or official agreement.
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d. Route 4: 418 km railway running east-west in the western part of the province, 
connecting Route 2 and Route 3 (see Route 4 in Map 2);
e. Route 5: 390 km railway running north-south, connecting Route 1 and Route 3 
via Palangka Raya, the provincial capital (see Route 5 in Map 2) (ibid.).
In May 2007 Governor Narang also signed an MoU with China Overseas Engineer-
ing Group, a subsidiary of the state-owned China Railway Engineering Corp (CREC), on 
the construction of a 517 km railway connecting Route 1 of the above-mentioned proposal 
to a port in Seruyan District via Palangka Raya (Kompas, June 8, 2007).
The railway infrastructure is to be developed through a public-private partnership 
(PPP) scheme, which the central government has promoted to finance infrastructure 
development projects in the country since the Yudhoyono administration.9)  Under the 
Map 2 Railway Routes Proposed by the Provincial Government of Central Kalimantan
Source: Based on Central Kalimantan Provincial Government (2009, 2).
9) Soon after Yudhoyono took over as president in 2004, the central government began to streamline 
regulatory laws and the system for PPP schemes for infrastructure projects.  PPP schemes were 
implemented since the 1980s but only for specific sectors, such as electricity and toll roads.  Fol-
lowing the Asian economic crisis in 1997, the central government embarked on the implementation 
of a legal and institutional framework that could serve as a basis for a greater degree of private 
participation in the form of PPPs and as part of the reform process for revitalizing the Indonesian 
economy.  However, it made little progress until Yudhoyono took the presidency (OECD 2012, 184).
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regulations of the PPP scheme, the government has to call for bids on a project and the 
tender winner is granted business licenses and permits.
In accordance with those regulations, the Central Kalimantan government asked for 
bids to be submitted for the construction of a 185 km railway between Puruk Cahu and 
Bangkuang in the Barito region as the first phase for Route 1.  The tender winner would 
be given a permit for constructing the rail line and a concession to operate the railway 
for 30 years.
By 2008, 16 consortiums of foreign and domestic companies, including Itochu and 
CREC, had participated in the bid.  After the screening at the end of 2011, the four con-
sortiums that passed the tender prequalifications were: Itochu and PT Toll (an Australia-
based transport and logistics firm); China Railways Group (a subsidiary of CREC) and 
two Indonesian companies called PT Mega Guna Ganda Semesta and PT Royal Energi; 
Dubai’s Drydocks World and PT MAP Resources Indonesia (an Indonesian engineering 
company); and PT Bakrie (one of Indonesia’s most powerful conglomerates) and Canada’s 
SNC Lavalin Thyssenkrupp.  The four consortiums submitted their project proposals to 
the provincial government, and in 2014 a tender was eventually awarded to the consor-
tium of China Railways Group and two Indonesian companies (Imam and Ester 2011; 
Antara News, October 13, 2014).10)
Keeping pace with its neighboring province, East Kalimantan proceeded with its 
own railway plan in partnership with foreign companies.  In March 2009 the district head 
of East Kutai approved a plan to construct railway infrastructure in the district; the plan 
was proposed by MEC Holdings, a subsidiary of the Dubai-based Trimex Group.  The 
railway network will be used for coal transportation from MEC’s mining concession area 
to a port terminal (see Map 3).  The plan is part of the company’s US$5 billion investment 
in East Kalimantan to build industrial facilities, including a power plant, aluminum 
smelter, and fertilizer plant.  The project received the complete support of the central 
government and the East Kalimantan provincial government (Railway Technology 2010).
Other foreign companies also participated in this mega project as a joint venture 
with MEC.  India-based IL&FS Transportation Networks Limited is providing financing 
10) After the determination of the tender, there is another process, including finalizing government 
regulations and financing for the tendered project.  At the national level, the Public Private Partner-
ship Central Unit (P3CU) under the Directorate of PPP Development in the National Development 
Planning Agency (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasional, BAPPENAS) is one of the key central 
units to monitor and evaluate PPP project development.  The P3CU is also assigned the tasks of 
formulating policies; assessing requests for contingent government support; assessing and recom-
mending project proposals feasible for government support; supporting government contracting 
agencies in the preparation of projects; and conducting PPP promotions, capacity building, and 
information dissemination (Strategic Asia 2012, 15).
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for the railway project as well as other projects planned by MEC.  MEC also has partnered 
with Canada-based CANAC Railway Services for operating and maintaining the railway 
and port terminal.  The feasibility studies for the railway line were conducted by UK-
based ARUP and US-based KPMG.  The two consulting companies identified the route 
of the railway line and the entire layout of the transport corridor, including the necessary 
infrastructure such as roads and bridges, terminal and jetty structure, and cargo-handling 
facilities for the railway line.  They also prepared the possible timeline for the project’s 
construction and developed a complete financial plan and risk matrix for the railway line 
(ibid.).
MEC announced in March 2010 that it had completed the acquisition of land for the 
railway project in East Kutai District.  Generally, in Indonesia developers face problems 
with local villagers when acquiring land for any project.  However, an MEC representa-
tive said that the company had not experienced any such issues.  He said the company’s 
biggest concern initially was that the villagers would not give up their land, but “the truth 
is villagers are the easiest people to talk to.  If you go to them and tell them that your 
plan will create jobs, they will give you their land” (Bisara 2010).  The company had to 
also deal with many stakeholders, such as ministries in Jakarta, politicians, local govern-
ments, along with villagers.  Mahmud Azhar Lubis, the deputy chairman of the Indonesian 
Investment Coordinating Board (Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal), admired how 
Map 3 Location of Proposed MEC Railway Route
Sources: Based on Casson (2006, 67) and BAPPENAS (2013, 41).
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“MEC handled all the complications in the land acquisition delicately, by talking to each 
member and stakeholder of the local community, without putting any pressure” (Trimex 
2010).
Among other possible reasons for the smooth land acquisition were the company’s 
enormous financial capability for providing substantial financial compensation for the land 
acquired and paying for other miscellaneous expenses incurred during the process of 
coordination and negotiation with local stakeholders, and the expectations of villagers for 
more job opportunities created by the revitalization of the local economy with the con-
struction of the railway infrastructure.  Another factor could be the relatively narrow 
width of land used for building railway tracks compared with commercial logging and oil 
palm plantations, which need huge areas of land and sometimes encroach into natives’ 
customary land.11)  Other factors could be the lack of information on possible negative 
effects of railway construction, such as environmental degradation with the opening of 
larger mines, and the massive influx of immigrant workers from overpopulated Java, who 
might take most railway-related job opportunities away from locals.
IV Center-Local Conflicts of Interest
The smooth progress of the railway projects at the provincial level encouraged the pro-
vincial governments in Kalimantan to gain more support from the central government 
for their regional development.  In May 2010 the four governors of Kalimantan gathered 
in Jakarta to attend a National Development Planning Meeting (Musrenbang Nasional), 
and during their stay there, they worked hard to draw support from the central govern-
ment, especially for the railway infrastructure project (Badan Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Daerah Provinsi Kalimantan Barat 2010).
Their efforts paid off a year later, in May 2011, when the central government intro-
duced the Master Plan for the Acceleration and Expansion of Indonesia’s Economic 
Development 2011–2025 (Masterplan Percepatan dan Perluasan Pembangunan Ekonomi 
Indonesia, MP3EI), with the aim of transforming Indonesia into one of the 10 major 
economies in the world by 2025.  MP3EI identified six economic corridors (Sumatra, 
Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Bali-Nusa Tenggara, and Papua-Maluku Islands) to boost 
economic development, and it designated Kalimantan as a “center for production and 
processing of national mining and energy reserves” (Coordinating Ministry of Economic 
11) Compared with the vast hectares of oil palm plantations fully utilizing all the land within concession 
areas, railways need land only for the length of rail tracks and the width of the rail gauge (approxi-
mately 1,000–1,500 mm in Indonesia).
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Affairs 2011a).  The trans-Kalimantan railway infrastructure became part of the corridor 
project under which companies engaged in mining, particularly coal, would share the use 
of railways and roads constructed through a consortium model of a PPP scheme.
The central government also enacted certain necessary laws to facilitate infrastruc-
ture projects in Indonesia.  In December 2011 the national parliament approved a land-
acquisition bill that allowed the government to acquire private land more quickly in order 
to facilitate the development of new infrastructure projects such as roads, ports, power 
plants, airports, railways, dams, oil facilities, and other projects catering to the public 
interest.
During Soeharto’s New Order period, the government confiscated land easily by 
exercising the coercive power of the military.  After 1998, democratization brought a 
reduction in the military power and a rise in the number of local protests against land 
acquisitions.  This resulted in longer negotiation periods for acquiring land, with many 
cases taking as long as five years to settle.  The new Law on Land Procurement for 
Development in Public Interest (Law No. 2/2012) and Presidential Decree No. 71/2012, 
clearly outlined the procedures for land acquisition.  The law stipulates that the land 
acquisition process should be completed in less than 583 days.  A landowner will receive 
cash compensation, alternative land, resettlement, shareholding, or something else 
agreed upon by the government agency and the landowner.  The owner is required to 
release his or her land after receiving compensation or in accordance with a binding court 
decision in which the compensation will be deposited with the district court (Hanim and 
Afriyan 2011).
Serious steps were also undertaken by the central government to encourage foreign 
and domestic joint-venture investments in the trans-Kalimantan railway project.  In June 
2011 Hatta Rajasa, then Indonesian coordinating minister for the economy, was invited 
by the Russian government to attend the International Economic Forum.  He took the 
opportunity to attract Russian investments for the food security, energy, trade, and trans-
portation sectors as well as welcoming Russian participation in the trans-Kalimantan 
railway infrastructure project (Coordinating Ministry of Economic Affairs 2011b).  During 
a Jakarta meeting in early August 2011 between Hatta Rajasa and Alexander  Andreyevich 
Ivanov, the Russian ambassador to Indonesia, Russia confirmed its intention to invest 
US$2.5 billion for the construction of a 135 km railway link between East Kalimantan and 
Central Kalimantan to transport coal (Jakarta Post, August 1, 2011) (see Map 4).
However, this Russian bilateral agreement with the central government created a 
conflict given that the rail line would connect coal mines in Central Kalimantan to a port 
in East Kalimantan.  Soon after the Hatta and Ivanov meeting, Agustin Teras Narang, 
then governor of Central Kalimantan, expressed his stiff disagreement with the central 
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government and opposed the railway plan linking the two provinces.  Narang stated that 
Central Kalimantan had its own plan to build a railway network in the province.  He also 
argued that the central government’s plan of a railway link could destroy the environment 
as the tracks passed through areas of protected forest,12) while the provincial plan would 
not involve forest clearing since the railway would be built alongside roads and rivers. 
Narang even said that he would resign as governor if the central government persisted 
with the Russian railway plan (Berita Daerah, October 12, 2009; Jakarta Post, August 4, 
2011; Tempo Interaktif, August 8, 2011).
Following the governor’s objection, the provincial branch of the Dayak Customary 
Council (Dewan Adat Dayak, DAD), an organization of indigenous people in Kalimantan, 
also voiced its opposition to the central government’s plan.  Governor Narang is the 
Map 4 Central Government’s Proposed Trans-Kalimantan Railway Route
Source: Based on Kompas (February 8, 2012).
12) According to the forestry laws (Law No. 41/1999), Indonesian forest is classified into three catego-
ries: production forest (hutan produksi), protected forest (hutan lindung), and conservation forest 
(hutan konservasi).  Protected forest is a forest area having the main function of protecting life-
supporting systems for hydrology, preventing floods, controlling erosion, preventing sea water 
intrusion, and maintaining soil fertility (Article 1).  The use of protected forest can be in the form 
of utilizing its area, environmental services, and collection of non-timber forest products (Article 
26).  The law also stipulates that the use of forest area for development needs for non-forestry 
purposes can be made only in production and protected forest areas, and open-cast mining is pro-
hibited in protected forest (Article 38).
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president of the National Dayak Customary Council (Majelis Adat Dayak Nasional), 
DAD’s umbrella organization.  Provincial DAD members were concerned that natural 
resources from Central Kalimantan would be taken to East Kalimantan through the 
railway and nothing would remain in their own province (Surya 2011).
On the other hand, an environmental NGO called the Indonesian Forum for Environ-
ment (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia, WALHI) disagreed with the railway plans 
of both the central government and the provincial government, saying that the project 
could harm not only the environment but also the safety of people living alongside the 
Barito and Mahakam Rivers since the railway network would pass through the catchment 
areas (Jakarta Post, August 7, 2011).
In fact, the provincial government acknowledged the possible environmental impact 
on the Barito region caused by the railway construction.  However, it justified the project 
from an engineering point of view by saying:
Throughout this part of Central Kalimantan, there are very significant environmental issues con-
nected with coal mining and commercial forestry.  Of particular concern is . . . coal roads from the 
coal mining areas to the Barito River. . . . The road corridors are wide and the construction and 
operation of these roads have caused: loss of forest cover for long distances, significant dust creation 
particularly during the construction phase, blocking of local drainage channels and only limited 
replacement of cross and parallel drainage.  Although the rail construction and operation will cause 
environmental impacts it is likely that these impacts will be less than impacts caused by the con-
tinued construction of coal roads.  In addition the environmental benefits of rail for the transporta-
tion of coal will be greater if the construction of new coal roads is restricted for all new coal mines. 
Coal roads will still be necessary from the mine to the rail head, but coal roads to the Barito River 
will not be necessary. (Central Kalimantan Provincial Government 2009, 16)
This statement indicates that the provincial government used different arguments 
and logic to push through its own railway plan depending on whom it had to persuade. 
The provincial government actually recognized that the rail construction and operations 
would cause an impact on the environment.  Thus, it used the rhetoric of “a less- damaging 
way of infrastructure development” to persuade local stakeholders to agree to the pro-
vincial railway project while using the rhetoric of “defender of local communities and the 
environment” to oppose the central government’s plan.
Moreover, some domestic NGOs such as WALHI and the Indonesian Mining 
 Advocacy Network (Jaringan Advokasi Tambang, JATAM) were aware of another pos-
sible environmental impact—that the vast railway network would see a rapid increase of 
coal exploitation in Kalimantan.  Based on research by the two NGOs, JATAM reported 
that coal-mining and transportation operations by some companies had caused dust pol-
lution, displacement of indigenous communities, and disruption and threats to clean water 
supplies due to river pollution in several mining areas in Kalimantan (JATAM 2010). 
Political Dynamics of Foreign-Invested Development Projects in Decentralized Indonesia 429
However, the provincial government turned a blind eye to such possible destructive 
consequences after the construction of the railway.
From the double-talk and selective criticisms of the provincial government, it is 
likely that a concern for local communities and the environment is not the real reason 
for the provincial government to push through its own railway project and oppose a cross-
provincial railway network planned by the central government.  As demonstrated in the 
following section, the provincial government had another reason to adhere to its own 
railway plan.
V Local Struggle over the Barito Region
Governor Narang’s opposition to the central government’s railway plan to link Central 
and East Kalimantan was not essentially due to his concern for local communities and 
the environment.  Along with a fear that the profits from his province’s natural resources 
would be intercepted by the neighboring province, there was also a perceived risk that 
he would lose regional control, economically and politically, in the Barito region.
The main channel of transportation in the Barito region is the Barito River, which 
flows from the northeastern part of Central Kalimantan to Banjarmasin, the provincial 
capital of the neighboring province of South Kalimantan.  This has made Banjarmasin a 
key hub for logistics and commerce in the Barito region, although a major portion of the 
region administratively belongs to Central Kalimantan.  Coal and other commercial prod-
ucts such as timber, rubber, and palm oil from the upstream Barito districts are trans-
ported via the river to a port of lading in Banjarmasin, and commodities headed to the 
interior towns also have to go through Banjarmasin (see Map 5).
Even the road network connecting districts in the Barito region to Palangka Raya, 
the provincial capital of Central Kalimantan, has to pass through Banjarmasin.  There is 
a northern mountainous route connecting the Barito region to Palangka Raya, but it has 
been badly damaged by heavy trucks rumbling down the road daily.  Therefore, people 
prefer to take a southern route via Banjarmasin to go to the Barito region from Palangka 
Raya (see Map 6).
Hence, it is likely that Narang viewed the central government and Russia’s railway 
plan connecting the Barito region to East Kalimantan as taking the Barito region farther 
away from the control of the Central Kalimantan government (see Map 4).  On the other 
hand, the Central Kalimantan provincial government’s railway network plan would first 
connect districts in the Barito region and then extend the railway track to a port of lading 
in Kapuas District, located in the southeastern part of Central Kalimantan (see Map 2).
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Map 5 Barito River across the Provincial Border
Source: Based on NordNordWest/Wikipedia (2011).
Map 6 Road Network in Central Kalimantan
Source: Based on Kementerian Pekerjaan Umum dan Perumahan Rakyat, Republik Indonesia (2012).
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Not only economically but also in part socially and politically, the Barito region has 
been closer to South Kalimantan than Palangka Raya.  In the lower Barito region, local 
residents are mainly Banjarese—Malay descendants of aristocrats and subjects of the 
Banjar Kingdom (1526–1860) centered in South Kalimantan—while Dayaks live mainly 
in the middle and upper Barito regions.  One of the major Dayak sub-ethnic groups in the 
region is the Bakumpai, making up 36.4 percent of the 36,2815 total population of four 
districts (Murung Raya, North Barito, South Barito, and East Barito) in the middle and 
upper Barito regions (Badan Pusat Statistik 2001, 75).  Bakumpai people converted to 
Islam under the strong influence of the Banjar Kingdom, while many other Dayaks con-
verted to Christianity or continue to practice varieties of animism.  Narang is a Christian 
Dayak Ngaju, a major Dayak sub-ethnic group in the central part of Central Kalimantan 
that makes up 39.9 percent of the 670,218 total population of three districts in the pro-
vincial central part (Kapuas, Gunung Mas, Pulang Pisau) and Palangka Raya (ibid.).
The Bakumpai people also dominate politics in the Barito region.  The current 
district heads of North Barito, South Barito, and East Barito are of Bakumpai descent. 
Since 1999, Bakumpai politicians have played a leading role in proposing the formation 
of a new province of Barito Raya, consisting of Murung Raya, North Barito, South Barito, 
and East Barito in Central Kalimantan and the district of Barito Kuala in South  Kalimantan. 
If the new province is established, profits from the natural resources in the Barito region, 
including coal, will fly out of the hands of the Central Kalimantan provincial government 
and land in the hands of Bakumpai politicians.
In order for the formation of Barito Raya to materialize, the Bakumpai politicians 
also attempted to extend their influence at the provincial level.  In the 2010 gubernatorial 
election, two pairs of candidates for governor and vice governor campaigned for the 
formation of the new province of Barito Raya.  One pair was Achmad Amur, the Pulang 
Pisau district head, and Baharudin H. Lisa, the South Barito district head; and the other 
was Achmad Yuliansyah, the North Barito district head, and Didik Salmijardi, the former 
district head of East Kotawaringin.  They had a close contest with the pair of then incum-
bent governor Narang and vice governor Achmad Diran.
While Achmad Amur is Banjarese, Baharudin H. Lisa and Achmad Yuliansyah are 
Bakumpai.  Achmad Diran and Didik Salmijardi are immigrants of Javanese descent, a 
category that makes up 18.1 percent of the total population in Central Kalimantan (ibid.). 
In the gubernatorial election, Narang and Achmad Diran won 42.3 percent of votes, while 
Achmad Amur and Baharudin H. Lisa gained 37.7 percent and Achmad Yuliansyah and 
Didik Salmijardi gained 15.7 percent (Noorjani 2010).  Narang and Bakumpai politicians 
are certainly political adversaries, and thus Narang has to defend a provincial railway plan 
at all costs in order to retain the resource-rich Barito region in his province.
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VI Intra- and Inter-provincial Politics over Railway
A Conciliatory Move
In response to Governor Narang’s objection to the interprovincial railway plan, Hatta 
Rajasa, coordinating minister for the economy, called on Narang to compromise on the 
provincial railway project.  He stated that the railway project proposed by the provincial 
government had not materialized yet, and that the central government’s plan was more 
feasible than the provincial one since the latter intended to build a long railway, which 
would cost too much.  Hatta ensured that the central government would review the 
railway route so that it would not pass through protected forest areas (Tempo Interaktif, 
August 8, 2011).  While facing opposition from Central Kalimantan, the central govern-
ment continued the discussion with Russia on the trans-Kalimantan railway project, 
which became one of the agendas for the Russia-Indonesia High Level Meeting on 
 Bilateral Economic Cooperation in Jakarta in October 2011 (Media Indonesia, October 
27, 2011).
The central government made a conciliatory move in November 2011 to resolve the 
deadlock with the provincial government of Central Kalimantan over the railway project. 
The government-sponsored Indonesian Infrastructure Financial Guarantee Fund (PT 
Penjaminan Infrastruktur Indonesia, PII), which was launched in May 2010 for the pur-
pose of providing guarantees for infrastructure projects under the public-private partner-
ship scheme, agreed to guarantee a railway project planned by Central Kalimantan.  PII 
would guarantee investors from risks that could arise from licensing delays, land acquisi-
tion, and government policy changes (Jakarta Post, December 1, 2011).
East Kalimantan as Willing Ally
In contrast to Central Kalimantan, the provincial government of East Kalimantan 
 welcomed the railway plan proposed by the central government and Russia.  The East 
 Kalimantan government dispatched its delegation to Marketing Investment Indonesia in 
Moscow in September 2011 to undertake a possible business partnership with Russian 
investors.  Awang Faroek Ishak,13) the governor of East Kalimantan, and Andrey Shigaev, 
director of Kalimantan Rail—a subsidiary of Russian Railways Group, a public-private 
13) Awang Faroek Ishak was born to a local aristocratic Kutai family in 1948.  He was a scholar and 
became a member of parliament, representing East Kalimantan from 1987 to 1997.  He was also 
the provincial secretary of Golkar from 1983 to 1988.  After decentralization, he was elected as the 
district head of East Kutai in 2001 and reelected in 2006.  He was elected as governor of East 
Kalimantan in 2008, backed by the then President Yudhoyono’s Democratic Party (Partai Demokrat) 
(Morishita 2008).
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partnership railway company—signed an MoU in February 2012 on the construction of 
a 275 km railway and associated infrastructure in Kalimantan.
Russian Railways is the fourth-largest company in Russia by revenue, with over 
1195.2 billion rubles (about US$40 billion) in 2010.  The project consists of two phases. 
The first one involves building a railway between coastal Balikpapan and inland district 
of West Kutai in East Kalimantan, which will connect to the neighboring province of 
Central Kalimantan in the second phase.  The total project investment would be US$2.4 
billion.  The MoU signing event was attended by the Russian ambassador and represen-
tatives of Russian Railways and the Russian state-owned Bank for Development and 
Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank).  The Indonesian attendees were the 
deputy coordinating minister for economic affairs, the director general of the Indonesian 
Ministry of Transport, the director for Central and Eastern European affairs of the Indo-
nesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, district heads of East Kalimantan, and other officials 
(Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Indonesia 2012).
Russia is so serious about its investment in the trans-Kalimantan railway project 
that it established the Export Insurance Agency of Russia in November 2011 to facilitate 
the project.  For the Russian government, the railway construction is needed to support 
the plans of the Enplus Group, a Russia-based diversified mining, metals, and energy 
group owned by the Russian billionaire Oleg Deripaska, which plans to acquire a coal-
mining company in Indonesia (Algooth and Stefanus 2012b).
In order to avoid any conflict with the Central Kalimantan provincial government, 
the Russian government stated that the Kalimantan railway would pay special attention 
to avoid all protected forests in the area.  It also mentioned that the project would require 
careful planning and coordination with other existing projects in Central Kalimantan 
(Embassy of the Russian Federation in the Republic of Indonesia 2012).
However, Narang again voiced his strong opposition to the project on the day of the 
MoU signing ceremony between East Kalimantan and the Russian investor.  He said the 
Central Kalimantan government would not participate in the Russian-planned railway 
project.  He reiterated the argument that according to the Russian plan, the railway line 
would be constructed in a protected forest area in the Muller-Schwanner mountain range 
in Murung Raya District, which serves as a water catchment area (Algooth and Stefanus 
2012a).
The Russian investor was forced to shelve part of the project.  In March 2012 
Shigaev, the director of Kalimantan Rail, said that only after Central Kalimantan finished 
its own railway project would his company start to build the rail line connecting Central 
Kalimantan and East Kalimantan.  Syahrin Daulay, the head of the Provincial Regional 
Development Planning Agency (Bappeda) in Central Kalimantan, confirmed in April 2012 
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that the four governors in Kalimantan had agreed to build a rail network in their own 
regions first and after that the interconnection among provinces would be constructed 
(Tempo Interaktif, April 16, 2012).
District Power Play
While Governor Narang opposed the railway link between the two provinces, Achmad 
Yuliansyah, then district head of North Barito who was one of Narang’s rival candidates 
in the 2010 gubernatorial election, welcomed the MoU between East Kalimantan and the 
Russian investor.  Without giving any notice to Narang, Yuliansyah signed an MoU with 
Ismail Thomas, the district head of West Kutai in East Kalimantan, a northeastern neigh-
boring district of Central Kalimantan, on cooperation for interdistrict infrastructure 
develop ment—including the railway between the two provinces, which the provincial 
government of Central Kalimantan strongly opposed (Antara News, March 1, 2012).
The MoU obviously outraged Narang.  Siun Karoas, then provincial secretary of 
Central Kalimantan, stated that the provincial government strongly deplored the MoU 
signed by the district governments of North Barito and West Kutai without any consulta-
tion with the provincial government (Agustin Teras Narang Center, March 7, 2012). 
Narang immediately issued a letter of request to cancel the MoU between the two dis-
tricts.  Achmad Yuliansyah then made a rebuttal statement that it was the provincial 
government that had long ignored the North Barito district governments’ asking for 
support for infrastructure development such as a local airport, hospital, bridge, and so 
forth.  He also said that the interdistrict cooperation and coordination for infrastructure 
development across the provincial border had been discussed since 2004 (Kalteng Pos, 
March 15, 2012).
South Kalimantan’s Catch-up Attempt
Meanwhile, South Kalimantan has lagged far behind the neighboring provinces of Central 
and East Kalimantan in the promotion of local infrastructure development under the 
Kalimantan Corridor of MP3EI, including the railway construction.  In April 2012 Gusti 
Nurpansyah, an executive member of the Banua Care Forum (Forum Peduli Banua, FPB), 
a social organization aiming at improving social economic conditions in South  Kalimantan,14) 
14) The FPB was established in February 2012 by national and local figures in politics, business, and 
civil society who came from South Kalimantan.  As of 2015, they included Berry Nahdian Furqon, 
an executive director of WALHI; Mohammad Ilmi, an official of the National Atomic Energy Agency; 
Hasnuryadi Sulaiman, a son of Sulaiman HB, then provincial chairman of the Golkar Party and a 
founder of the Hasnur Group—which operates forestry, coal mining, oil palm plantations, infrastruc-
ture, shipping services, and so forth mainly in the Barito region; Aditya Mufi Ariffin, then national 
parliament member belonging to an Islamic party called United Development Party (Partai  Persatuan ↗
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expressed his hope that South Kalimantan would get actively involved in the implemen-
tation of the Kalimantan Corridor, not just stand by and watch.  The FPB intended to hold 
a focus group discussion on the Kalimantan Corridor and to invite national and local NGOs 
and young leaders to the discussion (Radar Banjarmasin, April 29, 2012).
In the middle of May 2012, Rudy Ariffin, then governor of South Kalimantan, led 
delegates from the four provinces in Kalimantan to urge the national parliament to 
increase subsidized fuel quotas since the allocation for Kalimantan was too small.  The 
central government restricted supplies of subsidized fuel, which costs less than half as 
much as regular fuel, to try to stop a surge in oil prices hurting its budget deficit.  Previ-
ously, a petition signed by the four Kalimantan governors was sent to the Ministry of 
Energy and Mineral Resources, the Upstream Oil and Gas Regulator and Implementing 
Agency (Badan Pelaksana Kegiatan Usaha Hulu Minyak dan Gas Bumi, BP Migas), and 
the national parliament, threatening to terminate coal supplies from Kalimantan if 
subsidized- fuel allocations were not raised.  The governors argued that the supply of fuel 
to the four Kalimantan provinces had to be raised from 7 percent of the total national 
allocation to 14 percent due to rapid economic development (Rangga 2012b).  Rudy Ariffin 
became the most active participant, as he was the only governor who attended the meet-
ing with members of the energy commission of the national parliament.  The other three 
governors were represented by their deputies.  The meeting ended with no decision 
(Jakarta Post, May 23, 2012).
At the end of May 2012, with support from Governor Rudy Ariffin, the FPB initiated 
a protest and launched a blockade against coal barges entering the lower Barito River—
in retaliation to the lack of fuel oil supply—and demanded a bigger quota of subsidized 
fuel for the Kalimantan region.  Thousands of local residents took part in the blockade of 
the coal transportation route using motorboats; they stopped at least 20 barges from 
sailing through.
The blockade affected the entire Barito region, including major coal mines in the 
territory of Central Kalimantan.  The Indonesian Coal Mining Association (APBI) threat-
ened to stop the supply of coal to Java from Central Kalimantan if the blockade at the 
Barito persisted.  The State Electric Company (Perusahaan Listrik Negara) prepared for 
the worst scenario if Java failed to receive coal supplies from Kalimantan once its entire 
coal stockpile was consumed.  Aside from halting supply, APBI estimated that coal com-
↘ Pembangunan, PPP) and a son of Rudy Ariffin, then governor of South Kalimantan; and Gusti Per-
dana Pesuma, an influential politician from South Kalimantan belonging to the Golkar Party.  Rudy 
Ariffin, then governor of South Kalimantan (2005–15), also supported the organization.  As of 2015 
he was a member of the advisory board of the FPB along with Gusti Muhammad Hatta, then min-
ister for research and technology (2011–14) (Media Kalimantan, February 16, 2012).
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panies would have to bear substantial losses.
Only a few barges could pass through Barito.  They were the barges owned by the 
Hasnur Group, as the owner was the father of Hasnuryadi Sulaiman, one of the FPB 
executive members, and by PT Adaro Indonesia, a big coal company that had a close 
relationship with the Hasnur Group.  Their barges passed through the Barito before 
protesters started a blockade (Rangga and Hans 2012; Radar Banjarmasin, May 17, 2012; 
Tribun News, May 26, 2012; Jurnal Nasional, May 28, 2012).  The two companies were 
probably told the time schedule of the blockade by the FPB.
A similar blockade was raised at the Mahakam River in East Kalimantan, led by the 
provincial branch of the Indonesian Youth National Committee (Komisi Nasional Pemuda 
Indonesia).  They were inspired by the Barito’s blockade.  However, the blockade in the 
Mahakam quickly fizzled out as Awang Faroek, the governor of East Kalimantan, disap-
proved of it and warned the protesters that they were committing a criminal offence 
(Tempo Interaktif, May 29, 2012).
As an emergency response to the blockade at the Barito River, Jero Wacik, then 
minister of energy and mineral resources, stated that the central government would 
increase the quotas for the supply of non-subsidized fuel to Kalimantan.  Governor Rudy 
Ariffin responded by asking the blockade organizers to stand down.  The blockade was 
over within a week (Rangga 2012a; Rangga and Hans 2012).  With the success of the 
blockade, Rudy Ariffin was able to show that South Kalimantan was capable of playing a 
leading role in the negotiations with the central government for the sake of regional 
development in Kalimantan, just like the neighboring provinces.
Windfall for Governor Narang
The blockade at the Barito brought a windfall to Governor Narang.  It showed the politi-
cal and business circles in Jakarta that the dependence on river transportation in the 
Barito region would pose a high risk to coal supply to Java as well as to the coal-mining 
industry in the middle and upper Barito regions in Central Kalimantan if blockades 
occurred in the lower Barito in the neighboring province.  It also demonstrated not only 
that the coal railway network in Central Kalimantan was vital to economic strategy but 
also that there was a need to diversify risk.
In July 2012, a declaration of commitment for the construction of a rail track between 
Murung Raya and Kapuas in Central Kalimantan was signed by state-owned companies, 
including PT PLN and PT PII, as well as the areas’ major coal-producing private compa-
nies such as PT BHP Billiton Indonesia, PT Asmin Koalindo Tuhup, and PT Indika 
Indonesia Resources.  The signing ceremony was held in front of then Indonesian Vice 
President Boediono and ministers in Palangka Raya (Kompas, July 12, 2012).
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Another railway line in Central Kalimantan also became a real possibility.  In August 
2012, Governor Narang and PT Kereta Api Indonesia (PT KAI), the state-owned railway 
company, signed an MoU on the construction of an approximately 200 km railway network 
running north to south in the mid-west part of the province.  It would connect the north-
ern district of Gunung Mas to a port in the southwestern district of Seruyan.  PT KAI 
showed its keen interest by agreeing to conduct a feasibility study on soil conditions right 
away.  This rail line would be used for goods and passenger trains.  PT KAI stated that 
the railway would not only improve the local economy and social welfare but also create 
job opportunities, since at least 1,000–2,000 railway officers were required to operate a 
railway system (Tempo Interaktif, August 3, 2012).
Narang expressed his long-standing concern that forests in Central Kalimantan had 
been cut and lost since the 1970s but the results of local development had never been 
seen, with the people living in poverty.  “Conditions of national roads in the province 
have been always severely damaged because 8-ton capacity trucks carrying 12 to 20 tons 
of load rumble down the roads daily,” he said.  “I feel even if hundreds of billions are 
spent on the construction of roads, they will always remain damaged and broken.  Given 
this situation, the solution is to build a railway line in Central Kalimantan” (ibid.).
VII Conclusion
The question to be asked is: How effectively planned is the trans-Kalimantan rail project 
going to be in the midst of the wheeling and dealing taking place at the district, provincial, 
central, and global levels?
As the case of East Kalimantan shows, local power holders would welcome a railway 
plan proposed by foreign investors and the central government if the project fitted in with 
the economic and political agenda of local government leaders.  However, as in the case 
of Central Kalimantan, the central government and foreign investors could face difficulty 
in securing investment deals if the proposed plan had the potential to undermine the 
power base of local power holders.  In such cases, as represented by Narang, the gover-
nor of Central Kalimantan, local political leaders have tried to hold a leading position by 
portraying themselves as defenders of local communities and the environment in their 
negotiations with foreign and national players.
It is, however, clear that the local government’s priority is not the concerns of local 
communities or the environment in Central Kalimantan.  The provincial government 
actually recognized that the rail construction and operations would cause an impact on 
the environment.  Thus, it used the rhetoric of “a less-damaging way of infrastructure 
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development” to persuade local stakeholders to agree to the provincial railway project 
while using the rhetoric of “defender of local communities and the environment” to 
oppose the central government’s plan.
Whatever the case may be, the voices of ordinary local residents in the region where 
the railway projects would be implemented have not been publicly heard in any significant 
way.  A possible reason could be that it has yet to sink in among residents that a coal 
railway will be built in their area.  They might have been listening to the politicians and 
businesspeople harping on the positive aspects of a new railway system.  They might 
have heard that the infrastructure development would lead to urbanization, with more 
jobs and economic opportunities as well as a better life for them.  They might be expect-
ing foreign companies to pay a large amount of financial compensation for their land.
The railway construction might also bring about some negative effects for local 
residents and the environment.  There might be an influx of immigrant workers from 
other provinces, and locals might have to compete with them for railway-related job 
opportunities, which could eventually lead to ethnic tensions.  Unplanned rapid urbaniza-
tion of Kalimantan might lead to social problems, including poverty.  Roads and paths 
might be opened up illegally from the railway line to interior forest areas, making it 
easier for illegal logging.  More coal-mining companies would enter the region, and they 
could include some that might not be able to fulfill the technical requirements and finan-
cial guarantees related to compulsory reclamation and post-mining rehabilitation.  Some 
companies might operate in a forest beyond their licensing area.  These issues could 
escalate if the central and local government authorities failed to supervise the planning 
of the rail infrastructure as well as control businesses and mining operations in the region.
Hence, the role of local governments is crucial not only in the negotiation process 
with the central government and foreign investors but also during the construction and 
operations of the railway.  However, general elections and direct elections for local gov-
ernment heads are held once five years, by which time major realignments can take place 
in national and local politics.  In Central Kalimantan, the last gubernatorial election was 
held in January 2016.  Narang was not able to run for re-election since the law limits the 
governor to two terms of office, and his favorite candidate was not elected as governor. 
Therefore, the direction for future research will be to seriously consider the impact of 
highly possible realignments in local politics on the progress of railway construction, and 
its effects on local residents and the environment.  How rapidly the pace of development 
and projects move in Kalimantan will very much depend on it.
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